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Abstract 
In this paper I reflect on Bersot and Arrigo’s argument that virtue ethics provides a 
sound ethical theory to guide judicial decisions concerning the legitimacy of subjecting 
mentality disordered offenders to long-term disciplinary solitary confinement.  I expand 
on three issues evident in the Bersot and Arrigo paper: (1) the nature and justification of 
punishment; (2) the concept of dignity and its relevance to mentally disordered 
offenders placed in disciplinary solitary confinement, and (3) the nature and scope of 
virtue theory in the criminal justice context.  
 
Keywords: Offender punishment; virtue theory; mentally disordered offenders 
 
 
Introduction 
In their target article Heather Bersot and Bruce Arrigo analyse the ethical theoretical 
commitments evident in judicial decisions concerning the placement of prisoners with 
mental disorders into long-term disciplinary solitary confinement. They conclude that 
these decisions are ethically suspect, in part, because they are guided by two inadequate 
ethical theories, Consequentialism and Formalism (Kantian ethics). Bersot and Arrigo 
argue that the application of these theories to the issue of solitary confinement is flawed 
for a number of reasons. For one thing, they draw attention away from social science 
research on the vulnerability of mentally disordered prisoners and the likelihood they will 
experience an exacerbation of their symptoms when in solitary confinement. 
Furthermore, the interests of offenders are inevitably overridden by the preferences of 
the rest of the community, often for unconvincing reasons. They suggest that virtue 
theory can provide a more comprehensive ethical theory which is better able to guide 
these kinds of judicial decisions, primarily because it assumes that all human beings Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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ought to be given the opportunity to live flourishing lives (i.e., experience satisfactory 
levels of well-being). This ethical requirement places a burden on the state to ensure 
penal policy and punishment practice reflect this, and related values, in their content and 
implementation. In their view a broad based (i.e., comprised of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, restorative justice, and commonsense justice) criminal justice policy 
called psychological jurisprudence, is consistent with virtue ethics, and as such, is ideally 
placed to underpin penal decisions and practices involving mentally disordered prisoners. 
The Bersot and Arrigo paper is an excellent example of the value of 
interdisciplinary work and its combination of textual investigation and ethical analysis is 
illuminating. However, because of the wide scope of their paper there are some 
inevitable conceptual loose ends and areas in which the argument is a little 
underdeveloped. This is particularly evident in the rather thin discussion of virtue theory. 
For example, Solomon (1988) made an important distinction between theories of 
morality that contain virtue components and those that are virtue ethical in a stronger 
sense.  Thus, Formalist and Consequentialist theories may refer to virtues (character 
traits) that are in some way related to their core ethical principles (e.g., compassion, 
respect) while not primarily basing their approach on these character traits and their 
moral development.  It seems to me that Bersot and Arrigo’s argument does not exclude 
this possibility and Consequentialism and Formalism may contain at least some virtue 
components. Furthermore, the question of (and controversies over) how to define virtues 
is not explicitly addressed in their paper. There is considerable debate over the definition 
of virtue with theorists disagreeing over whether it is pluralistic, monistic, facilitative of 
well-being or not necessarily so, and to what degree ethical judgements based on virtues 
are justified (Walker & Ivanhoe, 2007). The lack of attention to the definition of virtue is 
a shortcoming in the Bersot and Arrigo paper because it makes it harder for the reader 
to appreciate the soundness and force of their argument. For the purposes of this paper 
I will assume the validity of the following characterization of virtues by Walker and 
Ivanhoe (2007) is sufficient:  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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In general, virtue ethics views assess human character as a primary mode of 
understanding the rightness or wrongness of actions and the goodness or 
badness of lives lived, view traits of character as stable dispositions to act and 
feel in contextually appropriate or inappropriate ways, and understand the virtues 
and vices as the primary mode of assessing character (p.4). 
I do not intend to comment any further on conceptual problems associated with 
the Bersot and Arrigo definition and subsequent use of virtue theory but will concentrate 
instead on three other important issues raised by their paper: (1) the nature and 
justification of punishment; (2) the concept of dignity and its relevance to mentally 
disordered offenders placed in disciplinary solitary confinement, and (3) the nature and 
scope of virtue theory in the criminal justice context. 
Punishment and its Justification 
It is a little strange that while the Bersot and Arriogo paper is about a form of 
punishment and its judicial justification there is no discussion of the concept or an 
attempt to provide an ethical justification of punishment practices. In my view further 
examination of this legal concept is necessary and may provide an additional resource 
for contesting the ethically suspect practice of disciplinary solitary confinement.  
What is punishment? In brief, state inflicted punishment in the criminal justice 
system involves the intentional imposition of a burden on individuals following their 
violation of important social norms that are intended to protect the significant common 
interests of members of the community (Boonin, 2008).  According to Boonin (2008), 
punishment exhibits five separate, but collectively necessary, elements: authorization by 
the state; intentionality (consciously directed towards a particular outcome); reprobative 
(expresses disapproval or censure); retributive (follow a wrongful act committed by the 
offender); and harmful (result in suffering, a burden, or deprivation to the offender). Any 
action that does not exemplify these five elements is (arguably) not an instance of 
punishment Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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Bersot and Arrigo rightly point out problems with Consequentialism and 
Formalism’s justification of punishment in the example of solitary confinement. In 
essence, the problem is that judges applying these ethical theories fail to sufficiently 
acknowledge the serious harm suffered by prisoners with mental disorders placed in 
disciplinary confinement. That is, they fail to appreciate that the nature of the suffering 
imposed by the state on prisoners greatly outweighs the gravity of the disciplinary 
infringements committed; there is a lack of proportionality, In short, the interests of the 
state and the wider community are unacceptably privileged over those of prisoners.   
A difficulty with the Bersot and Arrigo discussion is that they tend to speak about 
Formalism and Consequentialism as ethical theories rather than as specifying them as 
justifications of punishment.  I think it would be more valuable to address punishment 
practices and the arguments used to support them more directly and this means drawing 
from the criminal justice and legal philosophical literature on punishment.  While the 
appeal to psychological jurisprudence (PJ) is useful and can be seen as a way of 
construing punishment, a more explicit and helpful move would be to appeal to a specific 
theory of punishment that is consistent with both PJ and virtue theory. 
In my view, Duff’s communicative theory of punishment fits the bill nicely (Ward 
& Salmon, 2009). According to Duff (2001), it is important to pay attention to the rights 
of all stakeholders in the criminal justice system, including offenders, because of their 
equal moral status; thus communicative theories of punishment have a relationship 
focus. Because offenders are viewed as fellow members of the moral community it is 
taken for granted that the aim of punishment is to communicate the wrongness of their 
actions to them so they have an opportunity to redeem themselves and ultimately be 
reconciled to the community. Crimes are viewed as violations of important community 
norms that the offender is assumed to endorse as well. Duff argues that there are three 
aims integral to the institution of punishment: secular repentance (an acknowledgment 
of the harm committed), reform (a determination to change), and reconciliation 
(reintegration into the community) through the imposition of sanctions. Any action the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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meets the definition of punishment and that does not contain these three features, he 
agues, is ethically unjustified. 
It is possible to make explicit links between Duff’s theory and the elements of PF 
because of its emphasis on community participation and the assumption that all 
individuals are of equal, fundamental moral value. This also resonates with virtue theory 
and it is possible to derive ethical virtues that reflect this view of punishment. For 
example, empathic concern, forgiveness, respect, self-awareness, compassion, fairness 
can be viewed as aspects of character traits that will assist criminal justice actors to 
make ethical decisions about such matters as disciplinary solitary confinement. An 
advantage of introducing a theory of punishment such as Duff’s is that it the relationship 
between virtue ethics, PJ, and punishment practices are more clearly specified. 
Dignity and Disciplinary Solitary Confinement 
Bersot and Arrigo point out that a number of the court decisions concerning the issue of 
solitary confinement raise the question of human dignity and stress the  need to ensure 
that punishment doe not violate prisoners’ objective and subjective sense of worth. 
Dignity has been conceptualized in a number of ways but has at its centre the core 
meaning of the worthiness of all human beings and its manifestation in their autonomy, 
self-perception, level of well being, conduct, social status, and living circumstances 
(Beyleveld & Brownsword, 2001; Waldron, 2009). Offenders and prisoners share this 
dignity with nonoffending members of the community and, as such, ought to be treated 
in ways that reflect their high rank or intrinsic worthiness.   
In their paper, Bersot and Arrigo appear to link references to dignity to Formalist 
ethical theories, pretty much exclusively. However, this is a mistake as the concept of 
human dignity is apparent in most ethical theories and extends beyond human beings 
capacity for self-governance or autonomy, a Kantian, formalist idea (Ward & Syversen, 
2009). In other words, the concept of dignity is an ethically more basic idea and as such 
constitutes common ground between rival ethical theories. According to Beyleveld and Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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Brownsword, (2001), the concept of dignity has two major strands, empowerment 
(conditions that enable the exercise of agency and decision making, being able to live a 
life) and constraint (conditions that protect individuals from social denigration and 
ridicule, such as living in abject poverty or acting in ways that do not reflect the high 
status of a human being). With the enriched concept of dignity in mind it is evident that 
placing prisoners with mental disorders in disciplinary solitary confinement may well 
violate the requirements of dignity. Lack of goods such as social stimulation, access to 
leisure, meaningful work and so on, may cause an individual to decline to the point 
where he or she is unable to meet the standards of an acceptable human life.  
In other words, the concept of dignity is a flexible idea that can do quite a lot of 
ethical work on its own, and what’s more, is consistent with a wide range of ethical 
theories. In my view, it provides another point of critical attack on the unacceptable 
practice of the institution of solitary disciplinary confinement. In fact, in an earlier paper 
we have suggested that mid level ethical concepts such as dignity, and human rights 
provide a non question begging way for theorists and researchers to critically evaluate 
their practices, because they are almost universally endorsed. By way of contrast, there 
are fierce and somewhat partisan disputes between proponents of different ethical 
theories concerning which is the deepest, has the widest scope, is more consistent, and 
so on. Disputes that make it hard for individuals with varying theoretical allegiances to 
appreciate what they each have in common. 
Ethical and Epistemic Virtues: Persons and Insinuations 
In general, virtues are stable character traits that dispose individuals to perceive, feel, 
and act in certain ways that have ethical significance. A positive virtue will prompt 
someone to act in ethically good ways while a vice will lead to actions that are frowned 
upon, and are viewed as unjustified. For example, a callous person is predisposed to act 
in a manner that result in suffering to others and ignores their well-being and core 
interests. By way of contrast, a compassionate individual takes others interests into Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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account before deciding how to proceed in a given situation.  Ideally, with appropriate 
moral socialization virtues become so ingrained that right actions flow effortlessly and 
individuals do not have to explicitly agonize over every ethically salient choice. In this 
situation, problems are intuitively framed in ethically appropriate ways and a person’s 
thoughts and associated feelings reliably lead him or her to doing the right thing.  
  With this background in mind it is easier to appreciate the force of Bersot and 
Arrigo’s claims. Reconstructing their argument somewhat, they assert that appropriate 
professional socialisation and self-reflection guided by virtue theory is more likely to 
result in ethical role related traits in criminal justice personal. That is, when making 
decisions about how to respond to mentally disordered prisoners transgressions, 
(virtuous) correctional personal should take into account their mental disorder, the 
relevant scientific and circumstantial data, and make punishment decisions that will not 
unjustifiably increase their suffering.  The presence of empathic concern and a 
corresponding respect for prisoners in general and mentally disordered prisoners in 
particular, will reinforce this tendency. In addition, it will be easier for personal who have 
acquired the appropriate virtues to embrace the humanistic and constructive policy and 
practices comprising PJ. 
I think that the potential for virtue theory to enhance the ethical treatment of 
mentally disordered offenders is very promising and I very much like the way Bersot and 
Arrigo develop their analysis and related ideas to this end. However, their argument 
could be even stronger if they apply virtue theory in a more comprehensive way. There 
are two recent elaborations of virtues theory that are relevant here: extending the 
concept of virtues to institutions, and utilizing the notion of epistemic or knowledge 
derived (intellectual) virtues. I will discuss each in turn. 
Andre (2002) has recently proposed that communities and institutions can be 
assessed from the perspective of virtue theory.  First, the culture of a community or an 
institution might facilitate the flourishing and well-being of individuals through the nature Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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of its policies and practices independently of the character traits of the individuals who 
work, or live, within it. A community with harsh law and order policies where offenders 
are viewed as moral strangers is unlikely to make a significant effort to welcome them 
back once they have served their sentences. Second, a prison with an anti rehabilitation 
culture may regard offenders’ psychological problems as ethically irrelevant and fail to 
appreciate the extent to which subsequent disciplinary infractions are, at least partially, 
caused by them. Andre suggests that stable features of institutions can be 
conceptualized as analogous to character traits in individuals and therefore, be the 
subject of ethical evaluation. In the above two examples the institutionally rooted  
pejorative view of offenders and lack of appropriate concern for their suffering reveals a 
considerable degree of callousness and lack of empathy, both serious moral flaws (vices). 
I suggest that scrutinizing criminal justice systems from this viewpoint would further 
boost Bersot and Arrigo’s overall argument for the utility of virtue ethics. It seems to me 
that neither Consequentialism nor Formalism has the theoretical resources to extend 
their scope in this way. 
A second, recent development of virtue theory has been to apply it to knowledge 
related virtues, and also, to explicitly think about the interaction between ethical and 
epistemic virtues (DePaul & Zagzebski, 2003). What are epistemic or intellectual virtues? 
Andre (2002) states that “Intellectual virtues, then, are acquired dispositions, in 
individuals and communities that promote growth in knowledge and understanding 
(p.205).” In the criminal justice system knowledge related virtues in both individuals and 
institutions could include cognitive flexibility, self-awareness, persistence, openness, 
curiosity, attention to detail, tolerance, responsiveness, knowledge (of policies, laws, 
theories, psychology etc), impartiality, constructive criticalness, and so on. It is 
conceivable that virtues such as those listed above would mean that the personal 
circumstances of prisoners’ situations and the relevant facts surrounding any disciplinary 
transgressions would be sought and taken into account. That is, epistemic virtues may Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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well help decision makes to acquire a better appreciation of the nature of offenders’ 
problems and their relationship to any subsequent rule violations.  
Within individuals and institutions /communities there is an interaction between 
moral and intellectual or epistemic virtues. An empathic person (moral virtue) will try to 
find out why a person acted as he or she did and attempt to put to one side any partisan 
feelings and attitudes. In turn, someone who approaches a problem with an open mind 
(intellectual virtue) will find it easier to appreciate another person’s perspective and to 
see him or her as a flesh and blood individual rather than an abstraction, as simply a 
member of a stigmatized group (e.g., “prisoner”, “guard” etc). There is an interaction 
between moral and epistemic virtues because both are required for effective and ethical 
action in the world. And because a flourishing human life depends on values, beliefs, and 
actions, it is to be expected that stable individual (and institutional) traits will increase, 
or decrease, the chances of this occurring. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the target paper by Bersot and Arrigo is a timely and important one. The 
analysis of judicial decisions concerning the placement of prisoners with mental disorders 
into disciplinary solitary confinement has highlighted the crucial role of ethical thinking 
and the theories that underpin it. The argument that virtue theory and its justification of 
the components of PJ can help us to understand why disciplinary confinement is wrong is 
I think sound, and is groundbreaking work. Furthermore, it promises to significantly 
advance the field of criminology and forensic psychology. While I applaud the creativity 
and scholarship displayed by Bersot and Arrigo I do think their argument has some gaps 
and could be strengthened.  More specifically, there is greater scope for drawing from 
virtue theory and also for making better use of the concepts of dignity and punishment. 
To this end, I hope the ideas contained in my commentary will help to open up some 
additional avenues for research into the relationship between criminal justice policy and 
practice. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary 
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